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Summary 
We construct a comprehensive panel data of 96 publicly traded European utilities over 
the period 1994-2005 in order to study the relationship between the capital structure of 
regulated firms, regulated prices, and investments, and examine if and how this 
interaction is affected by ownership structure. We show that firms in our sample 
increase their leverage after becoming regulated by an independent regulatory agency, 
but only if they are privately controlled. Moreover, we find that the leverage of these 
firms has a positive and significant effect on regulated prices, but not vice versa, and it 
also has a positive and significant effect on their investment levels. Our results are 
consistent with the theory that privately-controlled firms use leverage strategically to 
shield themselves against regulatory opportunism. 
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Ten years after the beginning of privatization and institutional reforms in network industries in 
Europe,  regulated  utilities  have  substantially  increased  their  financial  leverage.  Casual 
observation suggests that this trend is widespread across European countries and across sectors. 
For  example,  Telefonica  de  Espana,  the  Spanish  incumbent  telecom  operator,  increased  its 
leverage after its privatization in 1997 from 36% to 68% in 2005; Autostrade per l’Italia, the 
largest  freight  road  operator  in Italy,  increased  its  leverage  from  32%  in  1999,  when  it  was 
completely  privatised,  to  88%  in  2003;  National  Grid  Group  Plc,  the  U.K.  energy  transport 
operator, increased its leverage from 30% in 1997 to 72% in 2005; and Anglian Water Plc, the 
largest water company in England and Wales, raised its leverage from 7% in 1997 to 49% in 
2005. A joint study of the U.K. Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and the HM Treasury 
(DTI-HM, 2004) has expressed a concern about the “dash for debt” or “flight of equity” within 
the U.K. utilities sector from the mid-late 1990’s and argued that such high leverage “could imply 
greater risks of financial distress, transferring risk to consumers and taxpayers and threatening the 
future financeability of investment requirements” (DTI-HM, 2004, p. 6).
1 
  The  high  leverage  of  privately-owned  regulated  utilities  is  a  well-known  and  well-
documented phenomenon in the U.S., where large utilities were always privately owned and 
subject to rate regulation by state and by federal regulatory commissions since the 1910’s.
2 It is 
therefore interesting to observe a similar trend in network industries in Europe. The European 
context though differs from that in the U.S. in at least three important respects. First, private 
ownership and control of utilities is still the exception rather than the rule; indeed, despite the 
privatization wave, many European utilities are still controlled by central or local governments 
(see Bortolotti and Faccio, 2004). Second, the degree of liberalization varies considerably across 
countries, and in most sectors is still incomplete. Third, not all European utilities are regulated by 
independent regulatory agencies: in some sectors regulation is performed directly by ministries, 
governmental committees, or local governments. Hence, the typical institutional framework in 
Europe is different from that in the U.S. and this difference may have important implications for 
regulated firms’ financial decisions, possibly depending on their ownership structure. 
From a theoretical perspective, when regulators cannot commit to long-term regulated 
price, they may have an incentive, once the firm’s investments are sunk, to cut prices in order to 
                                                 
1 For a related report, see Ofwat and Ofgem (2006). 
2 See for example, Bowen, Daly and Huber (1982), Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim (1984), Smith (1986), and Barclay, 
Marx, and Smith (2003).  
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benefit consumers at the expense of the firm’s owners. High leverage can shield regulated firms 
against this type of regulatory opportunism because regulators are typically concerned about the 
stability of the industry they regulate and will therefore be reluctant to cut prices because this will 
expose the firm to the risk of financial distress (see e.g., Spiegel and Spulber, 1994 and 1997, and 
Spiegel, 1994 and 1996).
3 Hence, debt financing can alleviate regulatory opportunism and may 
therefore encourage regulated firms to increase their investment levels. This implies in turn that 
the capital structure of regulated firms, regulated prices, and investments are interrelated. 
In this paper, we first document the capital structure of publicly traded regulated utilities 
in the EU, and then explore its determinants. Given the large variation in the ownership structure 
of EU regulated firms, we are particularly interested in finding out if and how the interaction 
between capital structure, regulated prices, and investments, varies across different ownership 
structures. To  study  this  interaction,  we  have  constructed  a  comprehensive  panel  data  on  96 
publicly traded EU utilities over the period 1994-2005. Our data covers practically all publicly 
traded regulated utilities in the EU 15 countries and it includes financial and accounting data as 
well as data on the firms’ ownership structure, and the regulatory framework under which they 
operate. 
There are some earlier empirical studies on the capital structure of regulated firms, but 
these studies have focused mainly on the U.S. Taggart (1985) finds that electric utilities have 
increased their debt to equity ratios after the introduction of rate regulation in various states in the 
U.S. in the 1910’s. Dasgupta and Nanda (1993) study a cross-section of U.S. electric utilities, and 
find that firms operating in less pro-firm regulatory environments tend to have higher debt-equity 
ratios. Klein, Phillips and Shiu (2002) study a cross-section of U.S. property-liability insurers 
subject to varying degree of price regulation depending on the state/lines in which they operate 
and find strong and robust evidence that the degree of price regulation and its stringency have 
positive effects on the insurers’ leverage. Bulan and Sanyal (2005) study a panel of U.S. investor-
owned electric utilities for the period 1990-2000 and find that they reduced their debt to total 
assets ratios in response to the heightened regulatory and competitive uncertainty created by the 
deregulation  process.  Bulan  and  Sanyal  (2006),  use  a  similar  panel  to  show  that  after 
deregulation, U.S. investor-owned electric utilities respond to growth opportunities in a two-step 
process: first, they accumulate financial slack in anticipation of new growth opportunities, but 
then, when the growth opportunities become more viable, they use debt finance to finance them. 
                                                 
3 The effect of leverage on regulated prices was first identified by Taggart (1981), although his model does not 
consider the strategic interaction between the regulated firm and the regulator and does not examine the implications 
of the price-influence effect of leverage for the equilibrium choice of leverage.  
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Finally, Correia da Silva, Estache and Jarvela (2006), examine the leverage of 121 regulated 
utilities in 16 less developed countries over the period 1991-2002 and find that leverage varies 
significantly across sectors, with the highest leverage being observed in transportation and the 
lowest in water supply. Moreover, they find that leverage steadily increases over time while 
investment levels fall. 
To  the  best  of  our  knowledge,  our  paper  is  the  first  systematic  study  of  the  capital 
structure  of  European  utilities  and  the  first  to  examine  empirically  the  relationship  between 
capital structure, ownership structure, price regulation, and investments. The analysis of our panel 
data reveals the following: 
 
(i)  Utilities  tend  to  increase  their  leverage  following  the  introduction  of  price  regulation, 
provided that they are privately controlled.  
(ii)  The leverage and prices of regulated utilities are positively related, provided that they are 
privately controlled. Granger causality tests reveal that leverage affects price but not vice 
versa. 
(iii)  An increase in the leverage of regulated utilities has a significant positive effect on their 
market value, provided that they are privately controlled. 
(iv)  Privately controlled regulated utilities tend to invest less than state-controlled utilities, 
after  rate  regulation  is  introduced.  However,  investment  levels  of  privately  controlled 
utilities are significantly positively affected by leverage, while the investment levels of 
publicly controlled utilities are not. 
 
These  results  hold  even  after  controlling  for  several  firm-specific  characteristics and  for  key 
features  of  the  institutional  context,  such  as  the  intensity  of  market  liberalization,  investor 
protection and macroeconomic conditions. 
The  rest  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  presents  the  theoretical 
background and the empirical implications that we test. Section 3 provides a brief institutional 
framework of the regulatory environment in the EU. We describe our panel data in Section 4 and 
presents our empirical results in Section 5. Concluding remarks are in Section 6. 
 
2. Theoretical predictions 
Regulators set the prices of regulated rates by explicitly taking into account, among other things, 
the firm’s capital structure. In the U.S., this practice stems from the need to ensure regulated  
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firms a “fair rate of return” on their investments. This fair rate of return depends on the firm’s 
cost of capital, which in turn depends on the firm’s capital structure.
4 Under the RPI-X regulation, 
which is widely used in the EU, regulators set price caps that ensure that the regulated firm’s 
revenue will cover its operating costs, depreciation, and infrastructure renewals charges, and will 
provide the firm a return on its capital which will induce it to enhance and maintain its network. 
As in the U.S., the return on capital depends on the firm’s capital structure.
5 
The fact that regulated prices are set on the basis of the firm’s capital structure suggests 
that regulated firms can affect their prices by appropriately choosing their capital structure. To 
the extent that regulators can commit to use the firm’s weighted cost of capital as a basis for 
computing the rate of return that the firm should earn on its capital, one would expect regulated 
firms to prefer equity over debt because the cost of equity is generally higher than the cost of 
debt. 
However, in a series of papers, Spiegel and Spulber (1994 and 1997) and Spiegel (1994 
and 1996) show that if regulators cannot commit to a particular regulatory scheme, then regulated 
firms will have an incentive to finance their investments with debt. The idea is as follows: when 
regulators cannot commit to long-term regulated prices, they have an incentive to cut prices once 
the firm’s investments are sunk in order to benefit consumers at the expense of the firm’s owners. 
This opportunistic behavior in turn may induce regulated firms to underinvest. However, if the 
firm finances its investments with debt, then regulators, who are typically concerned about the 
financial stability of the industry they regulate, will have an incentive to set higher regulated 
prices than they would otherwise set in order to minimize the risk that the firms will become 
financially  distressed.  Hence,  debt  financing  will  mitigate  regulatory  opportunism  and  will 
therefore boost the firm’s value and encourage it to invest. Regulators on their part, may allow 
firms to become highly leveraged because this allows them to implicitly commit not to behave 
opportunistically.  Since  this  commitment  in  turn  provides  regulated  firms  with  a  stronger 
incentive to invest, debt financing may end up being socially desirable. 
This theory yields the following testable hypotheses: 
 
                                                 
4 In an early decision from 1898, Smyth v. Ames (1898) 169 U.S. 466, the Supreme court of the U.S. decided that 
“what  the  company  is  entitled  to  ask  is  a  fair  return  upon  the  value  of  that  which  it  employs  for  the  public 
convenience.” In its landmark decision Federal Power Comm. v. Hope Natural Gas Co.,(1944) 320 U.S. 591, the 
Supreme court of the U.S., elaborated on the concept of fair rate of return and stated that “the return to the equity 
owner should be commensurate with returns on investments in other enterprises having corresponding risks.” 
5 See for example DTI-HM, (2004, p. 16).  
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Hypothesis 1: Regulated firms will increase their leverage once they become regulated by an 
independent regulatory authority. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Leverage leads to higher regulated prices. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Leverage boosts the firm’s market value. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Leverage strengthens the firm’s incentive to invest. 
 
Hypotheses 1-4 however are based on the implicit assumption that the regulated firm is 
privately owned. But as we mentioned in the Introduction, many European regulated utilities are 
still state-controlled. Clearly, if the government controls the regulated firm, then it can benefit 
consumers directly through the firm’s actions and does not need to rely on regulatory intervention 
through  opportunistic  behavior  to  achieve  this  objective.  Hence,  Hypotheses  1-4  do  not 
necessarily hold in the case of state-controlled firms.
6 We believe that the fact our panel data 
covers both privately-controlled and state-controlled-firms allows us to better test the theory since 
we can examine whether there is a significant difference between privately-controlled and state-
controlled firms. 
3. Regulatory environment 
The evolution of network industries in the EU has been remarkable. Following a big wave of 
nationalization after WWII, network industries in Europe were largely characterized by vertical 
integration, state monopoly, and public ownership and control. Under this regime, public utilities 
in electricity, gas, water, telecommunications, and transportation markets, were viewed as an 
operational branch of the government and were instructed to provide universal services at low 
prices, to absorb unemployment, and to spur investment in infrastructure. The government in turn 
played the dual role of owner and “regulator,” and fixed tariffs, quality standards, and investment 
levels. The result of this arrangement was ill-performing public monopolies and a high degree of 
inefficiency (Meggison and Netter, 2001). 
Starting  from  the  mid  1980’s,  however,  the  European  Commission  has  promoted  a 
gradual process of liberalization of the public utilities sector. The main goal of this process is to 
                                                 
6 In a Technical Appendix, available at http://www.tau.ac.il/~spiegel, we present a model that explicitly accounts for 
partial ownership of the regulated firm by the state and show that debt plays a smaller strategic role when the state 
has a larger stake in the firm.  
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improve  the  efficiency  and  service  quality  of  EU  utilities  and  boost  their  investments.  In 
particular, the European Commission has enacted a number of Directives aimed at setting up a 
common regulatory framework for EU countries, which in turn were required to transpose these 
directives  into  national  legislation.  However,  the  Commission  did  not  provide  any 
recommendation  about  the  ownership  structure  of  utilities  in  liberalized  markets,  leaving  the 
privatization decision completely in the hands of national governments.
7 As a result, central and 
local governments still remain major shareholders in many utilities in the EU. 
The extent of effective liberalization varies considerably across member states and across 
industries. In telecommunications, liberalization kicked off in 1987 with the publication of the 
Green Paper for the Development of the Common Market for telecommunication services and 
equipment. The Green Paper was followed by a sequence of directives, starting from Directive 
90/388 on “Competition in the markets for telecommunications services,” which established the 
institution of national independent regulatory authorities (IRA) in each member state,
8 followed 
by  a  series  of  directives  which  defined  the  main  principles  for  opening  up  the  market  for 
competition, including the “Licensing” Directive 97/13, the “Interconnection” Directive 97/33, 
and  the  “New  voice  telephony”  Directive  98/10.  However,  the  fundamental  piece  of  EC 
legislation  regarding  telecommunication  markets  is  the  “Full  Competition”  Directive  96/19, 
aiming  at  opening  up  the  market  for  voice  telephony  from  January  1,  1998.  This  directive 
provided  the  basic  principles  for  market  access,  interconnections  rules,  price  controls,  and 
universal service obligations.
9 
In the energy sector, the European Commission has been undertaking legislative actions 
since 1988 to establish an internal energy market for both electricity and natural gas within the 
EU. The milestone legislation is Directive 96/92 for the electricity, followed by Directive 98/30 
for  the  gas  market;  these  directives  aimed  at  gradually  introducing  competition  in 
generation/production and distribution, and at unbundling the different segments in the energy 
value chain. Importantly, these directives established independent national regulatory agencies.
10 
Initially, these agencies were granted powers to settle disputes among operators and were only 
required to be independent from the regulated firms.  Over time however, EC legislation has 
                                                 
7 For a more comprehensive analysis of the privatization process in Europe, see Bortolotti and Siniscalco (2004). 
8 Art. 7 Directive 90/388/EC and also preamble 11 to Directive 96/19/CE. 
9 These Directives have subsequently undergone a substantial review in 2000-2002. After a first integration with the 
“Communications Review” document (issued in 1999), a new regulatory framework was established with the four 
Directives 2002/19-22/EC  (the  Framework,  the Authorization,  the  Access  and  the  Universal  Service  Obligation 
Directive) aiming at introducing a more “ex post oriented” than “ex ante oriented” approach to market policy. For 
more details, see Buigues and Rey (2004). 
10 Art. 20 Directive 96/92/EC and Art. 21 of Directive 98/30/EC.  
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broadened the powers of regulatory agencies to encompass the responsibility of ensuring non-
discrimination, effective competition, and the efficient functioning of the market, along with the 
implementation of unbundling rules.
11 
Unlike  in  the  telecommunications  and  energy  sectors,  the  liberalization  efforts  in  the 
water and transportation sectors are still in early stages. At present, privatization activity is still 
limited, and, with the exception of the U.K., price regulation is still carried out by ministries or 
governmental  committees,  rather  than  by  an  IRA.  In  the  water  supply  industry,  the  “Water 
framework” Directive 200/60 has made some steps towards market opening by setting broad 
principles for water management and water pricing policies. The directive has been transposed in 
most  European  countries,  although  up  to  now,  privatization  in  the  water  sector  is  still  very 
limited, with only 6 member states being involved in privatization efforts. 
To the best of our knowledge, the only relevant directive in the transportation sector is 
Directive  96/67  on  air  transportation  infrastructures,  introducing  freedom  to  airports  in  the 
provision  of  ground  handling  services.  The  European  Union  however  is  considering  some 
proposals to deal with other aspects of the transportation sector such as the national systems of 
tolls  and  user  charges  for  infrastructure,
12  and  the  liberalization  of  market  access  to  port 
services.
13 The lack of a suitable regulatory framework is undoubtedly responsible for the limited 
scale of freight roads privatization, which is confined to a handful of transactions in Italy, France, 
and Portugal.  
Table A1 in the Appendix reports the timing of transposition of sectoral Directives in each 
member state, the year in which an IRA was established, and the allocation of proceeds from 
privatization over time.
14 In most member states, privatizations followed the implementation of 
EC directives regarding the adoption of regulatory framework and establishing IRAs. 
4. The data 
We  constructed  our  data  as  follows.  Using  Worldscope,  we  identify  publicly  traded  firms 
operating in regulated sectors during the period 1994-2005 in the EU 15 countries. We define 
regulated  sectors  to  be  those  in  which  entry  conditions  and  prices  are  subject  to  regulatory 
oversight either by the state or by an IRA. These sectors include electric and natural gas utilities, 
                                                 
11 Art. 23 Directive 2003/54 and Art. 25 Directive 2003/55. 
12 COM (2003) 448.  
13 COM (2004) 654.  
14 The data refer only to the energy and telecoms sectors because in water supply and transports a common regulatory 
framework is still under construction, no independent regulatory agency was established and privatization process 
are extremly limited.  
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water  supply  companies,  telecoms,  freight  roads  concessionaires,  and  transport  infrastructure 
operators such as ports, airports authorities, and rail infrastructure. Excluded from the sample are 
airlines,  oil  and  refinery  companies,  and  companies  operating  solely  in  wireless 
telecommunications  or  in  the  generation  of  electricity  because  typically  the  prices  of  these 
services are not regulated. 
By applying these selection criteria, we end up with an unbalanced panel of 96 publicly 
traded utilities and transportation infrastructure operators (927 firm-year observations) in 14 EU 
member states.
15 Table A2 in the Appendix lists the firms in our sample. All in all, we have 44 
firms that engage in electricity and gas distribution, 13 water supply companies, 18 telecoms 
(mainly vertically integrated operators), 9 freight roads concessionaires, and 12 transportation 
infrastructure operators.  
We  are  particularly  interested  in  disentangling  the  effects  of  state  versus  private 
ownership  in  the  capital  structure  of  regulated  firms.  Hence,  we  collected  data  on  the 
government’s ultimate control rights (UCR) in firms in our sample using the sources listed in 
Table A3 in the Appendix.
16 Since our sample often exhibits a complex web of cross-ownership 
patterns among firms (one firm holds the shares of another firm, which in turn holds the shares of 
a third firm and so on - see Figure 1 for an example), the government may have both direct as 
well as indirect control rights in firms. In order to measure the government’s UCR, we therefore 
use the weakest link concept (see La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shlifer (1999), Claessens, 
Djankov,  and  Lang  (2000),  Faccio  and  Lang  (2002),  and  Bortolotti  and  Faccio  (2004)). 
According to this concept, the UCR of a given investor (the government in our case) is simply 
equal to the  minimum  ownership stake along a chain (i.e., the weakest link). In the case of 
multiple chains, the UCR’s are summed up across all chains.
17 
Among the firms in our sample, 60% have been privatized over the 1994-2005 period. 
Overall, these firms were involved in 125 privatization transactions worth on aggregate €239 
billion, which is almost a half of the EU15 total privatization revenues (those include proceeds 
                                                 
15 We did not find any listed regulated utility in Luxembourg. The number of observations will vary according to 
data availability. For example, when we use market leverage as a variable, the number of observations drops to 795 
due to missing data in Worldscope. In the regression analysis, sample size is further reduced due to additional 
missing data in some control variables. 
16 In some cases, firms in our data have shares with multiple voting rights, although as of May 1998, such shares 
were outlawed in Italy, Spain, the U.K., and Germany. Prior to this, German firms could be authorized to issue shares 
with multiple voting rights by state authorities (Faccio and Lang, 2002). Unfortunately, our data sources do not 
report the identity of the owners of these shares and hence we must treat them as ordinary shares. As a result, our 
data on governmemt’s UCR may be biased downward.  
17 To illustrate, suppose that an investor has an ownership stake of 50% in firm A and 30% in firm B. Firm A in turn 
has a 30% ownership stake in firm C, while firm B has a 10% ownership stake in firm C. Then, the investor’s UCR 
in firm C is equal to min (50,30) + min (30,10) = 40.  
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from  privatizations  in  other  sectors,  like  banking  and  oil  companies).  Yet,  the  privatization 
process is still incomplete: as of 2005, the UCR of the state (including both central and local 
governments,  ministries,  and  various  branches  of  public  administration)  in  the  firms  in  our 
sample are 27% on average, with 28% of the firms being still under state control. Overall, the 
average UCR of the government in the firms in our sample over the period 1994-2005 were 
34.3%. In Table 1 we report the relevant ownership and financial information for the largest 30 
firms in our sample as of 2004-2005. 
Table 2 provides data at the country and sector levels, averaged over time. The table 
reveals  some  cross-country  differences.  For  instance,  privatization  appears  to  be  particularly 
advanced in Spain and in U.K., where the state’s average UCR are quite low, and companies are 
under private control during most (or even all) of our sample period. Likewise, privatization 
seems  to  be  advanced  in  the  telecommunications  sectors  in  Denmark,  Ireland, Italy,  and  the 
Netherlands. On the other hand, in Finland, France, Germany, Greece, and Sweden, governments 
seem to be reluctant to relinquish their control over regulated firms. 
 
4.1. Dependent variables 
Leverage, regulated prices, and investment are the main dependent variables in our study. For the 
theoretical  predictions  in  Section  2,  it  is  important  for  us  to  use  a  measure  of  leverage  that 
captures the risk of default. Therefore, we use the book value of debt (both long- and short-term) 
divided by the sum of the book value of debt and the market value of equity as our measure of 
leverage (that is, we use “market leverage”).
18 Accounting and financial market data have been 
collected from Worldscope. As Table 2 shows, telecoms and electric, gas, and water utilities 
appear to be more heavily leveraged on average than companies in the transportation sector. 
Interestingly, French and Portuguese regulated firms are the most highly leveraged across all 
sectors,  while  Italian  and  Portuguese  telecoms  appear  to  be  highly  leveraged  compared  to 
telecoms in other countries.  
Unfortunately,  we  were  unable  to  find  reliable  data  on  regulated  retail  prices  at  the 
individual firm level. Drawing from Eurostat and OECD sources (see Table A3 in the Appendix), 
we therefore collected retail price indices for all sectors in our data set except for infrastructures 
such as ports and docks and airports (the services provided by these sectors are considered to be 
intermediate rather than final services and we could not find price indexes either in the OECD or 
                                                 
18 See Rajan and Zingales (1995) for a discussion of alternative leverage measures. Notice that a more precise 
definition of market leverage would also include the market value of debt. However, given that debt is not always 
publicly traded, we were unable to find reliable data for that item.  
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Eurostat data or in national statistics). Given that there is still limited competition in the utilities 
sectors  and  given  that  there  is  little  price  dispersion,  we  believe  that  these  price  indexes 
appropriately reflect the prices of the regulated firms in our sample. The average annual growth 
rates of these indices, reported in Table 2, reveal that retail prices in telecommunications have 
declined by an average of 3% annually over our sample period. A quite different picture emerges 
in  electric,  gas,  and  water  utilities,  where  retail  prices  have  increased  by  an  average  of  1% 
annually, and to an even a larger extent in transportation, where retail prices have increased by an 
average of 3% annually. 
Investment rate represents the change in the fixed capital stock and includes new plants, 
property and equipment, as well as new capital goods acquired through mergers, acquisitions or 
divestitures. In the econometric analysis we use the investment rate calculated as the ratio of 
gross fixed investment to capital stock at the replacement value.
19 At the sector level, investment 
rates are higher in telecommunications (16% on average over the sample period), than in the 
energy and water sectors (13% on average) and transportation infrastructures (14% on average). 
 
4.2. Privatization, Regulatory and Institutional variables 
We use the data on government’s UCR described in Section 3.1 to define a Private Control 
dummy which takes the value 1 in every year in which the government’s UCR is below 50% and 
takes the value 0 in all other years. This variable therefore reflects whether the firm is “privately-
controlled” or “state-controlled.” In some of our analysis, we will use a more restrictive definition 
of private control, Private Control_30, according to which a firm is privately controlled only if 
the government’s UCR are less than 30% (instead of 50%). 
By construction, all firms in our sample are subject to some form of regulation. However, 
we  are interested in  studying  the  effect  of  regulation  by an  IRA  on the  firm’s  leverage  and 
investment, as opposed to public oversight by ministries or some other branch of the public 
                                                 
19 The accounting data from Worldscope only include historic cost valuations of fixed assets, which usually bear little 
relation to current replacement cost of long-lived fixed capital assets. Hence, we calculate the replacement cost of the 
capital stock using the perpetual inventory formula: pt+1Kt+1 = ptKt(1-d)(pt+1/pt) + pt+1It+1, where pt is the country-
specific implicit price deflator for gross capital formation in period t sourced by the OECD, Kt is the fixed capital 
stock in period t, It is the investment flow in period t, and d is the depreciation rate (see for example, Blundell, Bond 
and  Meghir,  1992).  To  compute  the  depreciation  rates,  we  use  the  Bureau  of  Economic  Analysis  estimates  as 
reported in “Rates of Depreciation, Service Lives, Declining Balance Rates, and Hulten-Wykoff Categories” and 
obtain the following depreciation rates: 4.4% for energy, gas and water supply, 3% for freight roads concessionaires, 
8% for telecommunications, and 4.5% for ports and airports. To obtain the starting values for the perpetual inventory 
formula, we assume that replacement cost valuations were equal to historic cost valuations for the first year of data 
available (usually 1994). In order to avoid loss of observations, we chose not to eliminate firms undergoing major 
acquisitions and divestitures, and hence split the firm’s time-series into “before” and “after” the event, and then keep 
both sub units provided each sub unit has at least three consecutive observations.  
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administration. We therefore use the information collected by Gilardi (2002) to construct an IRA 
dummy variable which takes the value 1 in every year in which the firm was formally subject to 
regulation by an IRA, and takes the value 0 in all other years. 
In order to capture the intensity of market liberalization in specific states and sectors, we 
use  a  Liberalization  Index  constructed  from  the  OECD  International  Regulation  database 
collected by Nicoletti et al. (2001) and updated by Conway and Nicoletti (2006). The index is an 
average of several indicators which vary from 0 to 6 (lower numbers indicate a greater degree of 
openness) and reflects entry barriers,
20 the state’s stake in firms that operate in the relevant sector, 
the market share of the dominant player(s), and the presence of price controls on retail prices and 
specific guidelines for its implementation. We eliminate the state ownership dimension from the 
Liberalization Index, because we use explicit ownership variable in our analysis, and recompute 
the average over the remaining OECD indicators. As in the original OECD index, high values of 
the index are associated with low degrees of liberalization. 
Another cross-country institutional difference that we control for is the legal protection of 
investors. To this end we use the “antidirector rights” index developed initially by La Porta et al. 
(1998) and updated by Pagano and Volpin (2005). This index is equal to the sum of six dummy 
variables, indicating if proxy by mail is allowed, shares are not blocked before a shareholder 
meeting,  cumulative  voting  for  directors  is  allowed,  oppressed  minorities  are  protected,  the 
percentage of share capital required to call an extraordinary shareholder meeting is less than 10%, 
and existing shareholders have preemptive rights at new equity offerings. 
Firm level controls will be described below in the relevant regressions in which they are 
used. 
 
5.  Empirical results  
Our main goal is to test Hypotheses 1-4 stated in Section 2. In Section 5.1 we study the leverage 
of firms in our sample and examine Hypothesis 1 that states that regulated firms will increase 
their leverage once they become regulated. In Section 5.2 we study the relationship between 
leverage  and  regulated  prices  and  test  Hypothesis  2  that  states  that  leverage  leads  to  higher 
regulated prices. In Section 5.3, we turn to Hypothesis 3 and examine whether leverage boosts the 
firm’s market value. Finally, in Section 5.4 we study the effect of leverage on investment and 
                                                 
20 Low values of the entry barriers indicators are associated with competition in all segments of the relevant sector 
and with vertical separation between downstream and upstream firms, while high values are associated with the 
existence of a vertically integrated legal monopoly.  
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examine whether it strengthens the firm’s incentive to invest. In all cases, the hypotheses are 
expected to hold in the case of privately-controlled firms but not necessarily in the case of state-
controlled-firms. 
In most of our analysis we will present random-effects estimates. Under fixed effects 
estimation, time invariant variables such as country and sector dummies cannot be estimated 
because  they  are  perfectly  collinear  with  the  firm  dummies.  Although  the  random  effects 
estimates are more efficient than fixed effects estimates, one must ensure that the individual 
invariant component in the error term under the random effects model is not correlated with 
regressors. To this end we use the Hausman (1978) specification test to test for the consistency of 
the  random  effects  coefficients.  Whenever  the  Hausman  test  suggests  that  the  random  effect 
model is inappropriate, we turn to fixed effects estimation (see e.g., Baltagi,  2001, or Arellano, 
2003). 
 
5.1. Leverage  
We begin in Table 3 by dividing the 795 firm-year observations we have for market leverage into 
four groups, depending on whether firms are regulated by an IRA or not and whether they are 
privately- or state-controlled. A simple comparison of the mean leverage of firms (see Panel A) 
reveals that firms in our sample are significantly more leveraged when regulated by an IRA, and 
this is true irrespective of whether firms are privately- or state-controlled. Moreover, controlling 
for the type of regulation which is place, privately-controlled firms appear to be more leveraged 
than state-controlled firms, although the difference is insignificant. Panel B of Table 3 examines 
the robustness of this comparison to the definition of control by expanding the definition of state-
control to include all firms in which the government’s UCR are 30% or more (instead of 50%). 
Although the mean leverage values remain similar, we notice that under this more restrictive 
definition of private control, the difference between privately- and state-controlled firms is now 
statistically significant in the presence of an IRA (with a p-value of 7%).  
These preliminary results suggest that ownership structure may matter for the financial 
decisions  of  regulated  firms.  To  explore this issue  further,  we  perform  a  thorough  empirical 
analysis of leverage. In particular, we are interested in finding out whether European utilities 
increase their leverage when they become regulated by an IRA, and what effect, if any, their 
ownership structure has on the interaction between capital structure and rate regulation. 
The  results  of  our  leverage  regressions  are  shown  in  Table  4.  Our  key  explanatory 
variables here are the IRA dummy which is equal to 1 if an IRA is in place and is equal to 0  
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otherwise, and the Private Control dummy which is equal to 1 if the government’s UCR are less 
than 50%, and equal to 0 otherwise. Following the empirical literature on the determinants of 
capital structure we include firm-specific controls.
21  We therefore include in the regressions the 
log of real total assets to control for firm size, the fixed assets to total assets ratio to control for 
asset tangibility, and the EBIT (earning before interests and taxes) to total assets ratio to control 
for profitability and “efficiency” (more efficient firms are likely to make higher earnings with the 
same assets).
22 To control for the fact that debt may be preferred if shareholders’ interests are 
weakly protected, we use the Investor Protection index defined in Section 4.2. Given that our 
sample firms are incorporated in 14 European countries and operate in 7 regulated sectors, we 
also control for country and sector-specific effects by including the country-specific growth rate 
of GDP to account for differences in macroeconomic conditions over time, the Liberalization 
index  to  account  for  competitive  conditions,  and  market  openness.  Finally,  to  control  for 
unaccounted factors related to the regulatory environment we also include country, sector, and 
year dummies. 
In Table 4 we present random-effects estimates. The table shows that firm size has a 
positive effect on leverage, while tangibility and profitability-efficiency both have a negative 
effect. These results are common in the empirical literature on capital structure.
23 The negative 
and significant coefficient on GDP growth suggests that firms tend to rely more heavily on equity 
and internal funds when the macroeconomic conditions improve. 
More importantly for us, Column 1 of Table 4 shows that the IRA dummy is insignificant, 
while the Private Control*IRA dummy is positive and significant across all specifications. This 
suggests that, consistent with Hypothesis 1, the introduction of an IRA has a significant positive 
                                                 
21 Conditional on data availability, we define our explanatory variables following Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan 
and Zingales (1995), and Fama and French (2002).  
22 Ideally, we would have also liked to control for ownership concentration since it is plausible that firms with 
concentrated ownership will prefer to use more debt than firms with dispersed ownership because their controlling 
shareholders will be reluctant to dilute their ownership stakes by issuing equity. Moreover, managers of firms with 
more dispersed ownership have a larger effect on their firms’ decisions and may be reluctant to issue debt which 
raises  the  risk  of  financial  distress  (in  which  case  they  may  bear  a  personal  disutility).  However,  due  to  the 
prevalence of cross-ownership, computing ownership concentration for the firms in our data is a formidable task 
since in general, individual shareholders hold both direct as well as indirect ownership stakes. Computing the latter is 
very hard (see e.g., Dorofeenko et al, 2005). In our case, this task is particularly hard since we have 11 years of data 
(ownership structure has to be constructed year by year). 
23 The positive effect of the log of total assets is consistent with the idea that size is an inverse proxy for the 
probability of bankruptcy (see example, Rajan and Zingales, 1995). The negative and significant coefficient on the 
ratio between fixed and total assets, our proxy for tangibility, is less common because tangible assets can be used as 
collateral and hence reduce the cost of debt. However, we also find that profitability, measured by EBIT to total 
assets ratio, is significantly negative. Taken together these results are viewed as consistent with the pecking order 
theory of capital structure in which a preferential order of financial sources – internal funds first, debt, and then 
equity as a last resource - is postulated (see, for example, Booth et al., 2001).       
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effect on the firm’s leverage, but only if the firm is privately-controlled. Column 2 of Table 4 
shows that the results remain virtually unchanged when we replace the Private Control dummy 
with  the  more  restrictive  Private Control_30,  according to  which  a firm  is  considered to  be 
privately  controlled  only  if  the  government’s  UCR  are  less  than  30%  (instead  of  50%).    In 
Column  (3),  we  replace  the  Private  Control  dummy  with  Government  UCR,  which  is  a 
continuous  variable  that  measures  the  government’s  UCR  in  the  firm.  Once  again,  we  find 
support  for  Hypothesis  1  since  the  Government  UCR  variable  is  insignificant,  while  the 
Government UCR*IRA variable is negative and highly significant (a higher government UCR 
means that the firm is “less private”). 
In Column 4 we check the robustness of our results by including the Investor protection 
and the Liberalization indexes as additional sector- and country-specific controls.
24 As before, the 
Private Control*IRA dummy is positive and significant. The negative sign on Investor protection 
is consistent with the idea that debt is preferred to equity financing when shareholder interests are 
weakly protected, while the negative sign on the Liberalization index suggests that regulated 
firms increase their leverage when there is a higher degrees of market openness. 
Finally, one could claim that firms that were privatized early were for some reason more 
highly leveraged than other firms in our sample and hence, the positive relation of leverage and 
ownership that we discovered earlier is spurious. To check whether this is the case, we excluded 
from  the  data  firms  that  were  “privatised”  during  our  sample  period.  That  is,  we  reran  the 
regressions on a sample that included only firms that were either state-controlled or privately-
controlled throughout the 1994-2005 period. The results are reported in Column 5. We find that 
the  Private  Control  dummy  becomes  significantly  negative  while  the  Private  Control*IRA 
becomes larger and more significant than before. These results confirm our previous results and 
supports the idea that privately-controlled regulated firms increase their leverage significantly 
after an IRA is established. 
 
5.2. Leverage and regulated prices 
Next,  we  consider  Hypothesis  2  that  states  that  higher  leverage  induces  regulators  to  raise 
regulated prices and hence boosts the firm’s value. To test whether regulated firms choose their 
leverage strategically in order to boost their rates, we apply the Granger (1969) and Sims (1972) 
                                                 
24 Note that since the OECD index from which we derive our Liberalization index is not available for transport 




25  These  tests  are  used  to  examine  whether  leverage  Granger-causes  regulated 
prices as the theory predicts. One alternative possibility is that regulated price Granger-causes 
leverage; this situation could arise if regulators can make a long-term commitment to regulated 
prices which in turn determines the firm’s revenue (up to exogenous demand shocks). The firm 
then adjusts its capital structure accordingly to fit its expected revenue stream. A third possibility 
is that leverage does not cause prices nor vice versa; rather the two variables may be correlated 
with a third variable that causes both of them. 
We  perform  the  Granger  causality  tests  by  estimating  the  following  bivariate 
autoregressive processes for sector- and country- specific retail price indices and leverage: 
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where Pi,t is the regulated price of firm i in period t, Levi,t is the leverage of firm i in period t, 
Yeart  is  a  year  dummy,  Sectorj  is  an  sector  dummy  equal  to  1  if  the  firm  is  in  sector  j  = 
telecommunications, energy, or water (as mentioned earlier, we do not have price indices for 
infrastructures such as ports and docks and airports), mi is a firm dummy, and e is white noise. 
We present fixed effects estimates.
26 If, as the theory predicts, leverage Granger-causes prices but 
not vice versa, then bt-1 and bt-2 are significant while gt-1 and gt-2 are not, and moreover, an F-test 
will indicate that Levi,t-1 and Levi,t-2 contribute significantly to the explanatory power of regression 
(1), while Pi,t-1 and Pi,t-2 do not contribute significantly to the explanatory power of equation (2). 
Again, we expect these results to hold in the case of private firms, but not necessarily in the case 
of state-controlled firms. 
                                                 
25 Edwards and Waverman (2006) and Gasmi, Noumba and Recuero Virto (2006) also use Granger causality tests to 
investigate  simultaneity  between  interconnected  rates  and  regulatory  independence  and  between  the  quality  of 
political institutions and regulatory performance, respectively.    
26 The Hausman test suggested that the fixed effect model was more appropriate than the random effects model.   
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The results are reported in Table 5. Table 5.1 shows that the lagged leverage terms are 
individually and jointly significant, and overall have a positive effect on the regulated price. As a 
result, we can reject the null hypothesis that leverage does not Granger-cause regulated prices. 
This  conclusion  holds  both  for  the  full  sample  of  EU  utilities  (Column  1),  a  sub-sample  of 
privately-controlled firms (Column 2), and a sub-sample of firms that are regulated by an IRA 
(Column 4). On the other hand, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected for the sub-sample of state-
controlled  firms  (Column  3).  Table  5.2  shows that  we cannot  reject  the  null  hypothesis  that 
regulated prices do not Granger-cause leverage. 
Taken together, the results in Table 5 are consistent with the hypothesis that regulated 
firms choose their leverage strategically in order to boost their rates, and inconsistent with the 
idea that long-term commitments to regulated prices by regulators induce firms to adjust their 
capital structure to match their resulting expected revenue stream. 
 
5.3. Market value equations 
In this section we examine the effect of leverage on the market values of firms. The underlying 
idea here is that leverage shields regulated firms against regulatory opportunism and hence boosts 
their market value.
27 To test this hypothesis, we estimate a regression in which the dependent 
variable is the market-to-book value of the firm’s equity and the main explanatory variable is the 
firm’s  leverage.  As  with  Hypothesis  1,  the  positive  relationship  between  the  market-to-book 
value of the firm’s equity and its leverage is expected to hold if the regulated firm is private, but 
not necessarily if it is state-controlled and hence not subject to regulatory opportunism.  
Apart from leverage we also include in the regression, the log of real total assets, the 
EBIT to total assets ratio, the Investor Protection index, and sector and country dummies. As 
before, we account for ownership effects by using the Private Control dummy, which we include 
separately as well as interacted with Leverage. 
Table 6 shows that the coefficient on Leverage is negative and significant,
28 the Private 
Control dummy is insignificant, and the coefficient on Leverage*Private Control is positive and 
significant (at the 9% level). These results hold even after including various controls. These 
                                                 
27 This idea is based on the realistic assumption that regulated firms in the EU, which have been only recently 
privatized, do not necessarily have an optimal capital structure throughout our sample period. Otherwise, an increase 
in leverage will reflect the need to readjust the capital structure of the firm in response to some exogenous shock. 
This shock in turn may either have a positive effect on the firm (e.g., a reduction in the cost of financial distress) or a 
negative effect (e.g., the regulator become less pro-firm). Hence, if we start with an optimal capital structure, an 
increased leverage will be associated with either a higher or a lower market value. 
28 The negative and significant correlation between market to book and leverage is quite common (see e.g., Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995, and Booth et al., 2001).  
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results are consistent with Hypothesis 3 that leverage boosts the market values of firms that are 
regulated by an IRA provided that these firms are privately-controlled. 
 
5.4. Leverage and Investment  
We begin by presenting simple comparisons of the average investment rates of our sample firms 
in Table 7. Specifically, we divided the 674 firm-year observations available on the investment 
rate (i.e., the ratio between gross fixed investment flow and the capital stock at replacement 
value) into 4 groups, depending on whether they are regulated by an IRA or not and whether they 
are privately- or state-controlled. We find that privately-controlled firms have lower investment 
rates when regulated by an IRA, and especially when we use the more restrictive definition of 
private control (see Panel B in Table 7). This finding is consistent with the presence of regulatory 
opportunism  which  discourages  investments  by  privately-controlled  regulated  firms. 
Interestingly, state-controlled firms appear to be investing more than privately-controlled firms. 
We return to this point later. 
Following  these  preliminary  observations,  we  turn  to  econometric  test,  and  estimate 
investment  equations  in  which  the  dependent  variable  is  the  investment  rate  and  the  main 
explanatory variables are the lagged Leverage in level and its change, the Private Control dummy 
(or the continuous Government UCR variable), and the IRA dummy. 
Our  empirical  model  is  similar  to  that  used  by  Lyon  and  Mayo  (2005)  to  study  the 
behavior of U.S. electric utilities.
29 We regress the Investment to Capital Stock ratio on its lagged 
value to account for adjustment effects, on two lags of (real) Sales Growth, which serves as a 
proxy for an accelerator mechanism, on Interest Rate, which is a proxy for the cost of outside 
funds, and on the EBIT to Total Asset ratio to account for the return on assets and the utilization 
of assets (a higher EBIT/Asset implies that the firm utilizes its assets to a larger extent). Since the 
value of EBIT/Asset at which assets are fully utilized is likely to vary across sectors, we interact 
the EBIT to Asset ratio with the sector dummies. To control for institutional characteristics and 
regulatory environment, we add the Investor Protection and the Liberalization indexes. 
A  main  concern  when  regressing  investment  on  leverage  is  that  both  variables  are 
endogenous. To address this endogeneity problem, at least to some extent, we lag all explanatory 
                                                 
29 More precisely, in Lyon and Mayo (2005) the dependent variable is the level of gross investment flow in year t and 
the Lagged Capital Stock is one of the explanatory variables. For other references, see also Fazzari and Petersen 
(1993) and Hubbard (1998) for a survey on the empirical literature on investment decisions of individual firms.  
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variables  one  year.
30  Fortunately,  we  can  exploit  our  panel  data  to  discriminate  between  the 
decisions of privately- and state-controlled utilities since Hypothesis 4 applies in the case of 
privately-controlled firms, but not necessarily in the case of state-controlled firms. Hence, our 
main test here amounts to investigate the difference in the relationship between investment and 
leverage across ownership structures.
31 
The regression results are presented in Table 8.
32 Column 1 indicates that both the Lagged 
and Differenced Leverage terms are positive and significant, confirming the tight relationship 
between  investment  and  leverage.  Consistent  with  Table  7,  the  IRA  variable  is  negative  and 
significant. Moreover, the coefficient on the Private Control dummy is negative and significant 
(at the 10% level) indicating that other things being equal, privately-controlled utilities invest less 
than  state-controlled  utilities.  Taken  together,  these  findings  are  in  line  with  the  idea  that 
regulated  firms  underinvest  because  they  fear  regulatory  opportunism,  especially  if  they  are 
privately-controlled. Column 2 estimates the same model, with the exception that the Private 
Control dummy is replaced with the continuous Government UCR (higher values of this variable 
indicate  that  the  firm  is  “less  private”).  The  results  on  leverage  are  very  similar,  while  the 
Government UCR coefficient is positive, but only significant at the 15% level. In Column 3 we 
include sector and country-specific controls for market structure and financial institutions. Our 
results show that the Liberalization index has a negative, but insignificant, coefficient.
33 Unlike 
Column 4 in Table 4, the Investor Protection variable is insignificant. This suggests that investor 
protection affects the way firms finance their investments, but not the size of these investments. 
Columns 4 and 5 investigate cross-ownership differences by separating our sample into a 
sub-sample of privately-controlled firms (Column 4) and a sub-sample of state-controlled firms 
(Column  5).  The  results  show  that  Leverage  has  a  positive  significant  effect  on  privately-
controlled  firm,  but  not  on  state-controlled  firms,  thus  supporting  the  prediction  of  different 
investment  financing  behavior  across  ownership  structures.  In  both  columns,  the  change  in 
                                                 
30 It should be noted however that if a firm plans to invest in t, then it may issue debt already in t-1, or even in t-2 or 
t-3,  so  lagged  values  of  leverage  may  also  be,  at  least  in  part,  endogenous  and  hence  invalid  instruments. 
Unfortunately, finding alternative truly exogenous instruments is a major challenge. 
31 This approach has been widely used to test the effects of capital market imperfections, in particular the impact of 
asymmetric information, on investment decisions of individual firms classified into separate groups (Hubbard, 1998).  
32 We present fixed effects estimates because the Hausman (1978) test indicate that a fixed-effects model is more 
appropriate than a random effects model. By including the EBIT/Asset ratio interacted with industry dummies we 
attempt to control, at least in part, for unobservable industry effects. We also accounted for the possibility that shocks 
to investments will be serially correlated and estimated a variant of the investment equations using the Cochrane-
Orcutt transformation. We do not report the results from this alternative estimation procedure because they are very 
similar to the results reported in Table 8 and because they led to a decreases in the number of available observations. 
33 This finding is in line with Alesina et al. (2005) who show that entry liberalization and privatization (which are 
associated with small values of the index) have boosted the investment activity in OECD countries in the last decade.  
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leverage,  which  captures  the  expected  relationship  between  investment  and  debt  financing  is 
positive and significant (p-value = 0.000 for private firms, and 0.08 for state-controlled firms). 
Finally, the coefficient on IRA is negative and significant for privately-controlled firms, but not 
for  state-controlled  firms.  This  result  is  consistent  with  the  idea  that  private  firms  that  are 
regulated by an IRA underinvest. 
In Column 6 we restrict our analysis to the period when an IRA is in place (electricity, 
natural gas, telecommunications, and, in the case of the UK only, water utilities).
34 In Columns 7 
and 8 we separate the observations in Column 6 into a sub-sample of privately-controlled firms 
(Column 7) and a sub-sample of state-controlled firms (Column 8). The comparison between 
Columns 7 and 8 confirms the evidence found in Columns 4 and 5: lagged leverage and its 
change have a positive and significant effect on investment when firms are privately-controlled, 
but not when they are state-controlled firms. 
Finally, we note that the interest rate, which is included as a proxy for the cost of capital, 
has a negative and significant effect on the investment of privately-controlled firms, but has a 
weak impact on the investment of state-controlled firms. This suggests that state-controlled firm 
may  not  invest  efficiently  or  are  driven  by  external  (possibly  political)  motives,  so  their 
investment is independent of their cost of capital.  Apart from the interest rate, we find that the 
EBIT to Total Asset ratio interacted with sector dummies, our proxy for utilization of assets, is 
positive as expected and, for electric and gas utilities, also highly significant,
35 while the growth 
of sales, is insignificant in most specifications. 
In sum, our results show that private regulated firms tend to invest “less” than state-
controlled utilities, but their investment is found to be more sensitive to the level and change of 
leverage. Combined with our evidence on leverage, the results from investment equations suggest 
that privately-controlled firms offset the negative effect of regulatory opportunism on investment 
by using debt financing. As far as state controlled firms are concerned, our results indicate clearly 
that in regulated sectors they are more effective than private firms in boosting investment, even if 
they do not resort to leverage. A possible explanation for this result is that state controlled firms 
do  not  need  leverage  as  a  commitment  device  because  they  are  less  exposed  to  regulatory 
opportunism  to  begin  with.  Indeed,  the  large  stake  owned  by  the  government  provides  an 
alternative  instrument:  politically  appointed  regulators  will  be  wary  to  expropriate  sunk 
investments and to curb tariffs if dividends accrue to the State's budget. This view is consistent 
                                                 
34 We do not have a sufficient number of observations on the period before an IRA was established.      
35 Note that the default is represented by freight road utilities. The interaction with transport infrastructures was not 
estimated due to perfect collinearity with either IRA or control.      
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with the previous empirical results which have shown that partly privatized firms are less risky 
and more valuable than fully privatized firms (Bortolotti and Faccio, 2004). In this paper, we 
observe the implications of this conjecture on the capital structure of regulated firms given that 
state controlled firms will attract more easily capital to finance investment rather than debt. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Theoretical models suggest that if regulators cannot commit ex ante to a particular regulatory 
scheme, then the firms they regulate will have an incentive to finance their investments with debt. 
Indeed, following the large scale privatization and structural reforms in network industries in 
Europe, it appears that European regulated firms have accumulated large amounts of debt. This 
phenomenon, which has been described by the U.K. Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and 
the  HM  Treasury  (DTI-HM,  2004)  as  the  “dash  for  debt,”  has  raised  concerns  among 
policymakers about the financial stability of regulated utilities and their ability to finance future 
investments.  The  theory  however  suggests  that  debt  financing  allows  regulated  firms  and 
regulators to overcome, at least partly, the regulators’ inability to make long-term commitments 
to  prices,  and  hence  shields  firms  against  the  risk  of  future  price  reductions  once  their 
investments become sunk. The implication then is that debt financing boosts the market values of 
regulated firms and strengthens their incentives to invest. 
In this paper we construct a comprehensive panel of virtually all publicly traded regulated 
utilities in the EU15 states and use it in order to examine the interaction between the capital 
structure of regulated firms, regulated prices, market values, and investments. Our analysis shows 
that this interaction depends critically on two factors: (i) the regulatory framework, i.e., whether 
the firms are subject to regulation by an IRA or not, and (ii) the ownership structure, i.e., whether 
firms are privately- or state-controlled. 
Specifically,  we  find  that  EU  utilities  tend  to  increase  their  leverage  following  the 
introduction  of  an  IRA  but  only  if  they  are  privately-controlled.  Moreover,  the  leverage  of 
privately-controlled regulated firms has a positive effect on regulated prices, on the firms’ market 
values, and on their investments. By contrast, we do not find similar positive effects of leverage 
in the case of state-controlled firms. These results provide strong support for the hypothesis that 
privately-controlled regulated firms rely on debt financing as a way to shield themselves against 
opportunistic behavior on the part of independent regulatory authorities. Moreover, these results 
suggest that debt financing may have some desirable consequence since it benefits shareholders  
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and boosts investments. Of course, given that debt financing also leads to higher regulated prices 
and may also increase the likelihood of financial distress, it is clear that more research, both 
theoretically and empirically, is needed in order to determine if the “dash for debt” is a desirable 
phenomenon and (at least in part) a solution to a regulatory opportunism problem, or whether it is 
an unintended consequence of the privatization of firms in network industries and should be 
discouraged. Yet, we believe that our paper makes an important contribution to this debate by 
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Figure 1 -- The evolution of the Government Control Rights in Edison (Italy)
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Table 1 – The Top 30 European Regulated Companies by Market Capitalization 
 
           









Panel A: Telecommunications 
Telefonica de Espana SA  Spain  1987  71.88  0.30  0.0000 
Deutsche Telekom AG  Germany  1996  69.74  0.18  0.5750 
France Telecom  France  1997  64.58  0.20  0.3245 
Telecom Italia SpA  Italy  1997  56.04  0.35  0.0000 
British Telecommunications PLC  U.K.  1991  33.02  0.19  0.0000 
Telia Sonera AB  Sweden  2000  24.10  0.09  0.5904 
Koninklijke KPN NV  Netherlands  1994  21.32  0.16  0.0778 
Koninklijke PTT NV  Netherlands  1998  13.94  0.02  0.0960 
TeleDanmark AS  Denmark  1994  11.64  0.07  0.0000 
Portugal Telecom SA  Portugal  1995  11.27  0.83  0.1268 
Panel B: Energy and Water Supply 
Electricité de France  France  2005  68.88  0.20  0.8730 
E.ON  Germany  1987  68.14  0.11  0.0486 
Enel  Italy  1999  48.29  0.09  0.3219 
RWE  Germany  1922  41.47  0.23  0.3100 
Suez  France  1987  39.10  0.35  0.1977 
Vivendi  France  2000  36.00  0.13  0.1238 
British Gas PLC  U.K.  1986  35.03  0.02  0.0000 
Gaz de France  France  2005  28.80  0.09  0.8010 
National Grid Transo PLC  U.K.  1995  28.67  0.18  0.0000 
Iberdola  Spain  1992  24.60  0.20  0.0200 
Panel C: Airports, Ports and Docks, and Freight Roads 
Abertis  Spain  2003  14.36  0.13  0.0100 
Autostrade SpA  Italy  1999  13.69  0.04  0.0000 
Autoroutes du Sud de la France (ASF)  France  2002  13.65  0.09  0.0080 
BAA PLC  U.K.  1987  11.90  0.10  0.0000 
SAPRR (Autoroutes Paris-Rhin-Rhone)  France  2004  8.07  0.09  0.0000 
SANEF (Autoroutes du Nord et de l'Est de la 
France)  France  2005  6.21  0.05  0.1500 
Brisa Auto Estradas de Portugal  Portugal  1997  5.04  0.47  0.0500 
Fraport AG  Germany  2001  4.83  0.05  0.5860 
Associated British Ports Hldgs  U.K.  1983  3.04  0.05  0.0000 
Kobenhavns Lufthavne A/S  Denmark  1994  2.33  0.04  0.3920 
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Table 2 – Country and Sector Distribution of Regulated Firms, EU 15, 1994-2005 
 
This table reports the mean values for the sample firms by country and sector over the 1994-2005 period. Market Leverage is 
total debt divided by the sum of total debt and the market value of equity. Annual Price Change is the annual growth rate of 
the corresponding sector price index. Investment Rate is gross investment divided by the stock of capital at replacement value. 
Government Control Rights are the mean ultimate control rights held by the State in regulated firms. Liberalization Index is a 
revised version of the OECD Overall Index of Regulation of Nicoletti et al. (2001) that does not incorporate the Public 
Ownership Indicator. Investor Protection is the antidirectors rights index developed by Pagano and Volpin (2005).  
 
               
Country 
 














Panel A: Telecommunications 
Austria  1  0.20  -0.03  0.10  0.50  1.64  2.75 
Belgium  1  0.34  -0.01  0.12  0.61  3.43  2.00 
Denmark  1  0.12  -0.02  0.19  0.17  2.00  2.00 
Finland  1  0.16  0.01  0.19  0.52  0.85  3.00 
France  1  0.28  -0.02  0.13  0.68  2.81  3.33 
Germany  1  0.17  -0.03  0.10  0.75  2.81  2.67 
Greece  1  0.10  -0.03  0.18  0.64  3.68  2.92 
Ireland  1  0.27  -0.01  0.20  0.00  2.36  4.00 
Italy  1  0.38  -0.02  0.21  0.18  3.23  3.58 
Netherlands  2  0.12  -0.01  0.15  0.35  2.32  2.00 
Portugal  1  0.44  -0.01  0.14  0.30  3.57  3.50 
Spain  1  0.19  -0.01  0.14  0.04  3.16  4.00 
Sweden  1  0.08  -0.02  0.18  0.77  1.60  3.00 
UK  3  0.12  -0.02  0.19  0.13  1.11  5.00 
Total  17  0.20  -0.02  0.16  0.35  2.40  3.29 
Panel B: Energy  and Water Supply 
Austria  3  0.16  0.00  0.12  0.51  3.70  2.50 
Belgium  2  0.10  -0.01  0.18  0.53  3.23  2.00 
Denmark  ….  ….  ….  ….  ….  ….  …. 
Finland  1  0.23  0.01  0.19  0.81  1.39  3.00 
France  5  0.32  0.01  0.12  0.60  4.65  3.36 
Germany  4  0.22  0.01  0.17  0.35  2.94  2.67 
Greece  3  0.14  0.03  0.21  0.75  3.45  3.00 
Ireland  ….  ….  ….  ….  ….  ….  …. 
Italy  15  0.14  0.02  0.14  0.64  2.80  4.17 
Netherlands  ….  ….  ….  ….  ….  ….  …. 
Portugal  1  0.39  0.03  0.06  0.64  3.14  3.50 
Spain  6  0.25  0.00  0.11  0.12  2.32  4.00 
Sweden  ….  ….  ….  ….  ….  ….  …. 
UK  17  0.17  0.02  0.12  0.00  0.65  5.00 
Total  57  0.19  0.01  0.13  0.34  2.44  3.87 
Panel C: Airports, Ports and Docks and Freight Roads 
Austria  1  0.02  ….  0.11  0.49  ….  2.50 
Belgium  ….  ….  ….  ….  ….  ….  …. 
Denmark  1  0.12  ….  0.14  0.47  ….  2.00 
Finland  ….  ….  ….  ….  ….  ….  …. 
France  4  0.10  0.02  0.13  0.69  1.75  3.70 
Germany  1  0.09  ….  0.10  0.87  ….  2.67 
Greece  1  0.02  ….  0.33  0.85  ….  3.00 
Ireland  ….  ….  ….  ….  ….  ….  …. 
Italy  6  0.11  0.03  0.15  0.37  5.77  3.98 
Netherlands  ….  ….  ….  ….  ….  ….  …. 
Portugal  1  0.28  0.03  0.09  0.31  1.02  3.55 
Spain  1  0.08  0.03  0.09  0.10  3.26  4.00 
Sweden  ….  ….  ….  ….  ….  ….  …. 
UK  5  0.08  ….  0.15  0.02  ....  5.00 
Total  21  0.10  0.03  0.14  0.34  3.53  3.88  
 
30 
Table 3 – Mean Leverage by Ownership and Regulation types 
 
Market Leverage is total debt divided by the sum of total debt and the market value of equity. Firms are defined “state-
controlled” if the government’s UCR exceed 50% (Panel A), or 30% (Panel B). (Standard errors are in parenthesis). 
 
Panel A: Average leverage 1994-2005 (50% control threshold) 
  IRA exists 
N = 490 
IRA does not exist 





N = 564 
0.202 
(0.010) 
N = 359 
0.163 
(0.011) 
N = 205 
0.039 
p = 0.01 
       
State-Controlled 
 
N = 231 
0.179 
(0.013) 
N = 131 
0.127 
(0.015) 
N = 100 
0.052 





p = 0.173 
N = 490 
0.036 
p = 0.05 
N = 305 
 
Panel B: Average leverage 1994-2005 (30% control threshold) 
  IRA exists 
N = 490 
IRA does not exist 





N = 455 
0.208 
(0.011) 
N = 299 
0.166 
(0.017) 
N = 156 
0.042 
p = 0.018 
       
State-Controlled 
(30%) 






N = 149 
0.042 





p = 0.07 
N = 490 
0.029 
p = 0.11 





Table 4 – Leverage, Ownership and Regulation 
 
The dependent variable is Leverage; it is defined as in Table 3. IRA is a dummy equal to 1 if an independent regulatory 
agency (IRA) is in place and is equal to 0 otherwise. Private Control is a dummy equal to 1 when the firm was privately-
controlled (i.e., the government’s UCR are below 50%) and is equal to 0 otherwise. In Column 2, Private control_30 is equal 
to 1 when the government’s UCR are below 30%. In Column 3, Government UCR is equal to the government’s UCR in the 
firm. Column 4 includes the Liberalization Index, a revised version of the OECD Index by Nicoletti et al. (2001) and the 
Investor Protection Index by Pagano and Volpin (2005). Column (5) reports the results for a subsample of firms that were not 
privatised over our sample period, i.e., were either state-controlled or privately-controlled throughout our sample period. All 
regressions include year, sector and country dummies. Random-effects estimates. Standard errors in parentheses are robust to 
heteroschedasticity and to within group serial correlation.  ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
 
Market Leverage  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Log of real total assets  0.039***  0.038***  0.039***  0.037***  0.028** 
  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.011)  (0.013) 
Fixed-to-Total Assets  -0.148***  -0.141***  -0.136**  -0.127**  -0.045 
  (0.056)  (0.058)  (0.055)  (0.066)  (0.088) 
GDP Growth  -0.033***  -0.032***  -0.034***  -0.041***  -0.042*** 
  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.013) 
EBIT-to-Total Assets  -0.293***  -0.299***  -0.295***  -0.252***  -0.321*** 
  (0.067)  (0.068)  (0.068)  (0.076)  (0.026) 
IRA  -0.054  -0.034  0.044*  -0.099**  -0.250*** 
  (0.035)  (0.028)  (0.025)  (0.049)  (0.057) 
Liberalization Index   -  -  -  -0.014*  -0.032*** 
  -  -  -  (0.009)  (0.010) 
Investor Protection         - 0.048***  -0.019 
        (0.016)  (0.026) 
Private Control  -0.019  -  -  -0.013  -0.148** 
  (0.027)  -  -  (0.042)  (0.065) 
Private Control_30  -  -0.010  -  -  - 
  -  (0.026)  -  -  - 
Private Control*IRA  0.072**  -  -  0.085**  0.204*** 
  (0.034)  -  -  (0.043)  (0.054) 
Private 
Control_30*IRA 
-  0.058**  -  -  - 
  -  (0.030)  -  -  - 
Government UCR   -  -  0.044  -  - 
  -  -  (0.055)  -  - 
Government UCR*IRA  -  -  -0.160***  -  - 
  -  -  (0.060)  -  - 
           
R squared within  0.248  0.246  0.253  0.294  0.284 
Wald-test c2 (p-value)  1172 (0.0)  1152 (0.00)  1127 (0.0)  2737(0.0)  2320(0.0) 
           
Hausman test c2  
(p-value) 
3.07 (1.00)  13.7 (0.75)  10.3 (0.94)  5.17 (0.99)  7.23(0.99) 
N. Firms [N. Obs.]  96 [785]  96 [785]  96 [785]  71 [570]  47[396]  
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Table 5.1 – Price Equations – Granger Tests 
 
The dependent variable in Tables 5.1 is the country and sector-specific utility price index (see Section 3 and Appendix A.3). 
The dependent variable in Table 5.2 is Leverage. Column 4 focuses only on firms that are subject to regulation by an IRA 
(telecoms, energy, and water supply firms in the U.K.) (see Gilardi, 2002). Fixed effects estimates. All regressions include also 
interacted year and sector dummies. Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroschedasticity and to within group serial 
correlation. *** = significant at the 1% level; ** = significant at the 5% level; * = significant at the 10% level. 
 










by an IRA 
Utility Pricet-1   0.573***  0.539***  0.366**  0.565*** 
  (0.057)  (0.067)  (0.175)  (0.063) 
Utility Pricet-2  -0.019  -0.047  0.080  -0.015 
  (0.040)  (0.053)  (0.178)  (0.048) 
Leveraget-1  0.515  2.321  -5.389  -0.172 
  (2.703)  (2.834)  (4.888)  (3.208) 
Leveraget-2  5.577***  6.293***  2.614  5.833*** 
  (1.923)  (2.212)  (3.585)  (2.315) 
         
F-test of H0   4.25  4.08  1.12  3.37 
p-value  (0.018)  (0.022)  (0.338)  (0.041) 
         
N. Firms [N. Obs.]  78 [501]  61 [380]  31 [121]  61 [398] 
 
 
Table 5.2 – Leverage Equations – Granger Tests 
 









Firms in IRA 
regulated sectors 
Leveraget-1   0.270***  0.243***  0.235  0.231*** 
  (0.090)  (0.097)  (0.171)  (0.095) 
Leverage 1t-2  -0.118  -0.131  -0.143  -0.157 
  (0.119)  (0.141)  (0.182)  (0.138) 
Utility Pricet-1  -0.001  -0.001  0.001  -0.002 
  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.005)  (0.001 
Utility Pricet-2  0.001  0.000  0.001  0.001 
  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.006)  (0.002) 
         
F-test of H0   0.63  0.07  0.03  0.75 
p-value  (0.533)  (0.928)  (0.971)  (0.476) 
         
N. Firms [N. Obs.]  78 [497]  61 [377]  31 [120]  61 [395]  
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Table 6 – Leverage and Market-to-Book Values 
 
The dependent variable is the Market-to-Book ratio (Market Capitalization/Book value of the Equity).  Leverage is defined 
as in Table 3. Private Control is defined as in Table 4. Investor Protection is the time-varying “antidirector rights” index by 
Pagano  and  Volpin  (2005).  Random-effects  estimates.  All  regressions  include  sector  and  country  dummies.  Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses.*** = significant at the 1% level; ** = significant at the 5%; * = significant at the 10%.  
 
Market to Book  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Leverage   -4.941***  -4.441***  -4.398***  -4.340*** 
  (1.325)  (1.273)  (1.271)  (1.245) 
Private Control  0.017  0.014  -0.027  -0.005 
  (0.289)  (0.296)  (0.293)  (0.288) 
Leverage*Private Control  2.548*  2.324*  2.303*  2.315* 
  (1.368)  (1.387)  (1.384)  (1.388) 
EBIT-to-Total Assets ratio  -  2.719**  2.724**  2.723** 
  -  (1.344)  (1.339)  (1.338) 
Investor Protection  -  -  0.068  0.076 
  -  -  (0.055)  (0.057) 
Log of real total assets  -  -  -  -0.064 
  -  -  -  (0.127) 
         
         
R squared (within)  0.175  0.103  0.104  0.104 
Wald-test c
2 (p value)  197.5 (0.00)  80.7 (0.00)  83.4 (0.00)  83.6 (0.00) 
         
Hausman test c
2  (p-value)  0.28 (0.96)  0.29 (0.99)  2.16 (0.83)  1.80 (0.94) 






Table 7 - Average Investment Rate by Ownership and Regulation types 
 
The investment rate is the ratio between gross fixed investment and fixed capital stock at replacement value. Firms are defined 
“state-controlled” if the government’s UCR exceed 50% (Panel A), or 30% (Panel B). (Standard errors are in parenthesis). 
 
Panel A: Average investment rate 1994-2005 (50% control threshold) 
  IRA exists 
N = 490 
IRA does not exist 





N = 430 
0.130 
(0.007) 
N = 267 
0.146 
(0.010) 
N = 163 
- 0.016 
p = 0.18 
State-Controlled 
 
N = 244 
0.149 
(0.011) 
N = 139 
0.132 
(0.012) 
N = 105 
0.018 





p = 0.12 
N = 406 
0.036 
p = 0.36 
N = 268 
 
Panel B: Average investment rate 1994-2005 (30% control threshold) 
  IRA exists 
N = 490 
IRA does not exist 





N = 344 
0.122 
(0.007) 
N = 220 
0.144 
(0.012) 
N = 124 
-0.022 
p = 0.096 
State-Controlled 
(30%) 






N = 144 
0.016 





p = 0.006 
N = 406 
0.006 
p = 0.721 





Table 8 – Fixed Capital Investment and Leverage- The impact of  Ownership and Regulation 
The dependent variable is the ratio between fixed investment and fixed capital at replacement value. Regressions in Columns 1-3 are on the entire sample; in Column 3 we add the 
Liberalization and the Investor protection Indexes. Columns 4 and 5 examines privately- and state-controlled utilities, separately. Column 6 examines the firms’ investment behavior 
after an IRA is established. Columns 7 and 8 examines privately- and state-controlled separately, after the set up of an IRA. Leverage is defined as in Table 3. Private Control is defined 
as in Table 4. Fixed-effects estimates. All regressions include time dummies. Standard errors in parentheses are robust to cross sectional heteroschedasticity and within group serial 
correlation. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 























after an IRA is 
established  
Fixed Investment to Capital Stock t-1  -0.046  -0.063  -0.065  0.052  -0.305***  -0.037  0.135*  -0.320*** 
  (0.072)  (0.077)  (0.073)  (0.081)  (0.098)  (0.074)  (0.073)  (0.108) 
Sales Growtht-1  -0.019  -0.020  -0.014  -0.031  -0.024  -0.030  0.014  -0.054 
  (0.037)  (0.037)  (0.040)  (0.049)  (0.084)  (0.035)  (0.044)  (0.077) 
Sales Growtht-2  -0.032  -0.033  -0.041  -0.096*  0.076  -0.031  -0.136***  0.084** 
  (0.042)  (0.041)  (0.044)  (0.050)  (0.050)  (0.040)  (0.046)  (0.041) 
LT_Interest Rate t-1  -0.058**  -0.049**  -0.066***  -0.073**  -0.028  -0.050**  -0.074*  -0.033* 
  (0.025)  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.037)  (0.018)  (0.024)  (0.039)  (0.018) 
EBIT to Total Asset t-1* Electricity  0.758**  0.778**  0.691*  0.965*  -0.189  0.748**  0.952**  0.336 
  (0.361)  (0.366)  (0.388)  (0.504)  (0.478)  (0.350)  (0.491)  (0.283) 
EBIT to Total Asset t-1* TLC  0.177  0.160  0.156  0.137  0.131  0.125  0.021  0.193 
  (0.118)  (0.123)  (0.126)  (0.200)  (0.201)  (0.125)  (0.186)  (0.239) 
EBIT to Total Asset t-1* Water  0.562  0.420  -  0.330  2.056  -0.280  -0.521  - 
  (0.448)  (0.393)  -  (0.400)  (2.887)  (0.667)  (0.532)  - 
EBIT to Total Asset t-1* Natural Gas  2.937**  2.881**  3.007**  3.772***  2.191  2.314**  2.810***  1.680 
  (1.204)  (1.207)  (1.199)  (1.250)  (1.680)  (1.042)  (0.924)  (1.586) 
Private Control t-1  -0.159*  -  -0.168*  -  -  -0.015  -  - 
  (0.091)  -  (0.088)  -  -  (0.041)  -  - 
Leverage t-1  0.180**  0.182**  0.215***  0.230***  0.093  0.237***  0.164*  0.359 
  (0.077)  (0.080)  (0.080)  (0.077)  (0.213)  (0.082)  (0.085)  (0.276) 
Differenced Leverage t-1  0.0239***  0.241***  0.279***  0.273***  0.232*  0.258***  0.235***  0.319* 
  (0.049)  (0.050)  (0.055)  (0.048)  (0.127)  (0.058)  (0.063)  (0.163) 
IRA   -0.086**  -0.083**  -0.094***  -0.095**  0.112  -  -  - 
  (0.039)  (0.039)  (0.037)  (0.039)  (0.078)  -  -  - 
Government UCR t-1  -  0.216  -  -  -  -  -  - 
  -  (0.147)  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Liberalization Index t-1  -  -  -0.010  -  -  -  -  - 
  -  -  (0.010)  -  -  -  -  - 
Investor Protection t-1  -  -  0.019  -  -  -  -  - 
  -  -  (0.019)  -  -  -  -  - 
R squared within  0.350  0.349  0.386  0.332  0.734   0.409  0.452  0.756 
F (p-value)  10.3 (0.00)  15.0 (0.00)  16.6 (0.00)  9.7 (0.00)  45.4 (0.00)  10.7 (0.00)  12.5 (0.00)  121.7 (0.00) 




Appendix A1 -- The timing of regulation and privatization in the  energy and telecommunications sectors in European countries 
 
  Energy (Electricity & Gas)  Telecommunications 
                   











































Italy  1999  2000  1995  30.52%  0  1997  1997  5.72%  5.72% 
UK  2000  2000  1989  100%  18.60%  1997  1984  94.84%  3.07% 
Spain  1997  1998  1998  23.91%  52.62%  1997  1996  22.17%  22.17% 
France  2000  2003  2000  2.54%  2.54%  1996  1996  2.24%  2.24% 
Portugal  1999  2006  1995  66.58%  12.94%  1997  2001  31.19%  100% 
Germany  1998  2003  2006  63.15%  100%  1996  1996  0%  0% 
Netherlands  1998  2001  1998  16.11%  0%  1998  1997  42.84%  41.86% 
Austria  1998  2000  2000  55.40%  70.76%  1997  1997  0%  0% 
Sweden  1997  2004  1998  0%  0%  1997  1992  0%  0% 
Finland  1998    1995  4.47%  0.42%  1997  1987  0.10%  0% 
Greece  1999  failure to 
transpose  2000  2.40%  0%  1999  1992  50.20%  0% 
Belgium  2000  1999  1999  10.12%  10.12%  1997  1991  79.33%  0% 
Ireland  1999  2000  1999  -  -  1996  1997  0%  0% 





Appendix A2 -- The Sample Firms 
 





Flughafen Wien AG  Austria  1994 – 2005  2000 
Kobenhavns Lufthavne A/S  Denmark  1994 – 2005  2000 
Aeroporti di Roma  Italy  1994 – 2000  2000 
Aeroporto di Firenze SpA  Italy  1999 – 2005  2000 
Aeroporto di Venezia  Italy  2002 – 2005  ------ 
BAA PLC  United Kingdom  1994 – 2005  1994 
Freight Roads 
Autoroutes du Sud de la France (ASF)  France  1999 – 2005  2005 
SANEF (Autoroutes du Nord et de l'Est de la France)  France  2002 – 2005  2005 
SAPRR (Autoroutes Paris-Rhin-Rhone)  France  2001 – 2005  2005 
Autostrada Torino-Milano  Italy  1994 – 2005  1994 
Autostrade SpA  Italy  1994 – 2005  1999 
Sias - Società Autostrada Torino Milano  Italy  1998 – 2005  1998 
Brisa Auto Estradas de Portugal  Portugal  1995 – 2005  1998 
Abertis  Spain  1994 – 2005  1994 
Ports and Docks 
Piraeus Port Authority  Greece  2001 – 2005  ------ 
Associated British Ports Hldgs  United Kingdom  1994 – 2005  1994 
Forth Ports PLC  United Kingdom  1994 – 2005  1994 
Mersey Docks & Harbour Co  United Kingdom  1994 – 2004  1994 
Railtrack Group PLC  United Kingdom  1996 – 2002  1996 
Telecommunications 
Telekom Austria AG  Austria  1998 – 2005  2000 
Belgacom SA  Belgium  1994 – 2005  ------ 
TeleDanmark AS  Denmark  1994 – 2005  1998 
Sonera  Finland  1997 – 2002  1997 
France Telecom  France  1994 – 2005  2004 
Deutsche Telekom AG  Germany  1994 – 2005  ------ 
OTE (Hellenic Telecom Organization)  Greece  1994 – 2005  2002 
EIRCOM  Ireland  1999 – 2005  1999 
Telecom Italia SpA  Italy  1994 – 2005  1997 
Koninklijke KPN NV  Netherlands  1994 – 2005  1994 
Koninklijke PTT NV  Netherlands  1996 – 2005  1996 
Portugal Telecom SA  Portugal  1994 – 2005  1997 
Telefonica de Espana SA  Spain  1994 – 2005  1994 
Telia AB  Sweden  1997 – 2005  ------ 
British Telecommunications PLC  United Kingdom  1994 – 2005  1994 
Cable & Wireless PLC  United Kingdom  1994 – 2005  1994 
Kingston Communications  United Kingdom  1998 – 2005  2000 
Water Supply 
Veolia  France  2000 – 2005  2001 
Vivendi  France  1994 – 2005  1994 
Thessaloniki Water  Greece  2001 – 2005  ------ 
Water Supply & Sewerage Systems Co of Athens  Greece  2000 – 2005  ------ 
Acquedotto Nicolay  Italy  1994 – 2005  ------ 
Condotta Acque Potabili (dal 2005: Acque Potabili)  Italy  1994 – 2004  2001 
AEA Technology PLC  United Kingdom  1997 – 2005  1997 
Anglian Water PLC  United Kingdom  1994 – 2005  1994 
Severn Trent PLC  United Kingdom  1994 – 2005  1994 
South West Water PLC  United Kingdom  1994 – 2005  1994 
Thames Water PLC  United Kingdom  1994 – 2000  1994 
Wessex Water PLC  United Kingdom  1994 – 1998  1994 




Appendix A2 -- The Sample Firms (continued) 
 





EVN AG  Austria  1994 - 2005  ------ 
Verbund  Austria  1994 - 2005  ------ 
Fortum  Finland  1994 - 2005  ------ 
Electricité de France  France  1994 - 2005  ------ 
MVV Energie AG  Germany  1996 - 2005  ------ 
VEBA AG  Germany  1994 - 2005  1994 
VIAG AG  Germany  1994 - 1999  1994 
Public Power Corporation SA  Greece  1998 - 2005  ------ 
AEM Milano  Italy  1996 - 2005  2004 
AEM Torino SpA  Italy  1999 - 2005  ------ 
Edison  Italy  1994 - 2005  1994 
Enel  Italy  1994 - 2005  2004 
EnerTad  Italy  1996 - 2005  1996 
Terna (Enel)  Italy  2000 - 2005  2004 
EDP Electricidade de Portugal  Portugal  1994 - 2005  2004 
ENDESA (Empresa Nacional de Electricidad SA)  Spain  1994 - 2005  1997 
Iberdola  Spain  1994 - 2005  1994 
Red Electrica de Espana SA  Spain  1995 - 2005  1999 
Union electrica Fenosa  Spain  1994 - 2005  1994 
British Energy PLC  United Kingdom  1996 - 2005  1996 
National Grid Group PLC  United Kingdom  1995 - 2005  1995 
National Power - PowerGen Ltd  United Kingdom  1994 - 2001  1994 
Scottish and Southern Energy  United Kingdom  1994 - 2005  1994 
ScottishPower/Hydro-Electric  United Kingdom  1994 - 2005  1994 
United Utilities  United Kingdom  1994 - 2005  1994 
Viridian  United Kingdom  1994 - 2005  1994 
Yorkshire Electricity Group  United Kingdom  1994 - 1997  1994 
Gas 
OMV AG  Austria  1994 - 2005  1994 
Distrigaz SA  Belgium  2001 - 2005  2001 
Fluxys  Belgium  2001 - 2005  2005 
Gaz de France  France  1994 - 2005  ------ 
Acsm SpA  Italy  1998 - 2005  ------ 
Amga SpA  Italy  1996 - 2005  ------ 
SNAM Rete Gas SpA  Italy  2000 - 2005  2000 
Enagas  Spain  2000 - 2005  2000 
Gas Natural SDG SA  Spain  1994 - 2005  1994 
British Gas PLC  United Kingdom  1994 - 2005  1994 
Centrica   United Kingdom  1996 - 2005  1996 
Multiutility 
Suez  France  1994 - 2005  1994 
Fraport AG  Germany  1994 - 2005  ------ 
RWE  Germany  1994 - 2005  1994 
ACEA SpA  Italy  1998 - 2005  ------ 
Acegas  Italy  1997 - 2005  ------ 
HERA  Italy  2001 - 2005  2001 
Meta SpA  Italy  2002 - 2004  ------ 
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Appendix A3 -- Data Sources 
  Panel A. Ownership Data 
Country  Individual Countries Sources 1994-2004  All Countries Sources 1994-2004 
Austria  1. Austrian Holding and Privatisation Agency, www.oiag.at 
Belgium  1. Bureau Fédéral du Plan (BFP), www.plan.be, "Participations Publiques dans le Secteur Marchand en 
Belgique, 1997-2003". 
Finland  1. Ministry of Trade & Industry, " State - Owned Companies" Publications, 1995, 2005. 
France  1. La Caisse des Dépôts, www.caissedesdepots.fr/FR/index.php 
2. L’Agence des participations de l’État (APE), www.ape.minefi.gouv.fr/ 
3. Euronext, www.euronext.com/home/0,3766,1732,00.html 
Germany  1. KfW, www.kfw.de/EN_Home/index.jsp 
Greece  1. Athens Stock Exchange, www.ase.gr/default_en.asp 
2. Hellenic Capital Market Commission, Annual Reports 1999-2005, www.hcmc.gr/english/index2.htm 
Italy  1. MEF, Dipartimento del Tesoro, "Libro bianco sulle privatizzazioni,” April 2001, 2002 and 2003. 
2.MEF, Dipartimento del Tesoro, "La relazione sulle privatizzazioni,” 1997-2000. 
3. MEF, Dipartimento del Tesoro, "Libro verde sulle partecipazioni dello Stato,” November 1992. 
4. MEF, www.dt.tesoro.it/Aree-Docum/Partecipaz/Partecipaz/Partecipate.htm_cvt.htm. 
5. IRI (2001) "Le privatizzazioni in Italia, 1992-2000". Edited by Bemporad S. and E. Reviglio. 
6. Mediobanca (2000) "Le privatizzazioni in Italia dal 1992". 
7. Borsa Italiana, "Operazioni di Privatizzazione - Anni 1993-2006,” 
www.borsaitaliana.it/documenti/ufficiostampa/datistorici/privatizzazioni_pdf.htm 
8. Consob, www.consob.it 
Netherlands  1. Ministry of Finance, www.minfin.nl/en/subjects,government-participation 
2. Morgan Stanley, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Vol. 9, Number 1, Spring 1996 
3. OECD, 1998,  Reforming Public Enterprises: The Netherlands. 
Portugal  1. Ministry of Finance and Public Administration, Economic Research and Forecasting Department 
(DGEP), www.dgep.pt/menprinci.html 
Spain  1. Sociedad Estatal de Participaciones Industriales, www.sepi.es 
2. Economic Monthly Report (1995 and 1999), La Caixa, www.lacaixa.comunicacions.com 
3. The Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores (CNMV), www.cnmv.es 
Sweden  1. Ministry of Industry, Employment and Communication, Annual Report for Government-Owned 
Companies, 2000 - 2005, www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/2106/a/19792 
UK  1. "Who Owns Whom in the UK Electricity Industry,” Electricity Association Policy Research, June 2003 
2. www.ukprivatisation.com 
  
1. Company Web Sites; 
2. Annual Reports; 
3.  20-F Reports; 
4. SEC, Filings & Forms (EDGAR), ww.sec.gov/edgar.shtml; 
5. Hoovers Company In-dept Records; 
6. SDC Thomson Financial; 
7. Amadeus, Bureau van Dijk; 
8. Lexis Nexis, Business News; 
9. Privatization Barometer, www.privatizationbarometer.net; 
10. Financial Times; 
11. For Banks and Financial Institutions: IMF Working Paper, 
2005, “State-Owned Banks, Stability, Privatization, and Growth: 
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Appendix A3 -- Data Sources (continued) 
Panel B. Additional Company Data 
Data sources used to identify privatized companies through public offers of shares in EU markets, and track name changes and M&A activity 
1. Thomson Financial Securities Data Corporation, SDC Platinum Global New Issues Database and Mergers & Acquisitions Database. 
2. Dow Jones Newswires, Dow Jones. 
3. The Privatization Barometer (www.privatizationbarometer.net) 
Accounting and Financial Market Data 
1. Worldscope. 
 
Panel C.  Institutional Data 
Data sources used for the regulatory independence, legal protection of investors and intensity of regulation and market liberalization 
1. Gilardi. F. (2002) “Policy Credibility and Delegation to Independent Regulatory Agencies: A Comparative Empirical Analysis,” Journal of European Public Policy, 9(6), 873-893 
2. Pagano, M. and Volpin, F. (2005) “The Political Economy of Corporate Governance,” American Economic Review, .95 (4): 1005-1030. 
3. OECD International Regulation database: Conway and Nicoletti (2006), "Product Market Regulation in Non-Manufacturing Sectors in OECD Countries: Measurement and Highlights,” 
OECD Economics Department Working Paper, http://www.oecd.org/eco/pmr  
 
Panel D. Price Data 
Data sources used to identify series of price indexes of final consumer prices in regulated sectors 
1. EUROSTAT – New Cronos: for electricity, gas, water, telecommunications  
2. National statistics and ASECAP for freight roads  
Data sources for country specific interest rates and investment prices  
1. Long term interest rates. OECD Factbook 2006, Environmental and social statistics 
2. OECD Gross fixed capital formation: implicit price deflator.  
 NOTE DI LAVORO DELLA FONDAZIONE ENI ENRICO MATTEI 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Paper Series 











NOTE DI LAVORO PUBLISHED IN 2007 
NRM 1.2007  Rinaldo Brau, Alessandro Lanza, and Francesco Pigliaru: How Fast are Small Tourism Countries Growing? 
The 1980-2003 Evidence 
PRCG 2.2007  C.V. Fiorio, M. Florio, S. Salini and P. Ferrari: Consumers’ Attitudes on Services of General Interest in the EU: 
Accessibility, Price and Quality 2000-2004 
PRCG 3.2007  Cesare Dosi and Michele Moretto: Concession Bidding Rules and Investment Time Flexibility 
IEM 4.2007  Chiara Longo, Matteo Manera, Anil Markandya and Elisa Scarpa: Evaluating the Empirical Performance of 
Alternative Econometric Models for Oil Price Forecasting 
PRCG 5.2007  Bernardo Bortolotti, William Megginson and Scott B. Smart: The Rise of Accelerated Seasoned Equity 
Underwritings 
CCMP 6.2007  Valentina Bosetti and Massimo Tavoni: Uncertain R&D, Backstop Technology and GHGs Stabilization 
CCMP 7.2007  Robert Küster, Ingo Ellersdorfer, Ulrich Fahl (lxxxi): A CGE-Analysis of Energy Policies Considering Labor 
Market Imperfections and Technology Specifications 
CCMP 8.2007  Mònica Serrano (lxxxi): The Production and Consumption Accounting Principles as a Guideline for Designing 
Environmental Tax Policy 
CCMP 9.2007  Erwin L. Corong (lxxxi): Economic and Poverty Impacts of a Voluntary Carbon Reduction for a Small 
Liberalized Developing Economy: The Case of the Philippines 
CCMP 10.2007  Valentina Bosetti, Emanuele Massetti, and Massimo Tavoni: The WITCH Model. Structure, Baseline, Solutions 
SIEV 11.2007  Margherita Turvani, Aline Chiabai, Anna Alberini and Stefania Tonin: Public Policies for Contaminated Site 
Cleanup: The Opinions of the Italian Public 
CCMP 12.2007  M. Berrittella, A. Certa, M. Enea and P. Zito: An Analytic Hierarchy Process for The Evaluation of Transport 
Policies to Reduce Climate Change Impacts 
NRM 13.2007  Francesco Bosello, Barbara Buchner, Jacopo Crimi, Carlo Giupponi and Andrea Povellato: The Kyoto 
Protocol and the Effect of Existing and Planned Measures in the Agricultural and Forestry Sector in the EU25 
NRM 14.2007  Francesco Bosello, Carlo Giupponi and Andrea Povellato: A Review of Recent Studies on Cost Effectiveness of 
GHG Mitigation Measures in the European Agro-Forestry Sector 
CCMP 15.2007  Massimo Tavoni, Brent Sohngen, and Valentina Bosetti: Forestry and the Carbon Market Response to Stabilize 
Climate 
ETA 16.2007  Erik Ansink and Arjan Ruijs: Climate Change and the Stability of Water Allocation Agreements 
ETA 17.2007  François Gusdorf and Stéphane Hallegatte: Compact or Spread-Out Cities: Urban Planning, Taxation, and the 
Vulnerability to Transportation Shocks 
NRM 18.2007  Giovanni Bella: A Bug’s Life: Competition Among Species Towards the Environment 
IEM 19.2007  Valeria Termini and Laura Cavallo: “Spot, Bilateral and Futures Trading in Electricity Markets. Implications for 
Stability” 
ETA 20.2007  Stéphane Hallegatte and Michael Ghil: Endogenous Business Cycles and the Economic Response to Exogenous 
Shocks 
CTN 21.2007  Thierry Bréchet, François Gerard and Henry Tulkens: Climate Coalitions: A Theoretical and Computational 
Appraisal 
CCMP 22.2007  Claudia Kettner, Angela Köppl, Stefan P. Schleicher and Gregor Thenius: Stringency and Distribution  in the 
EU Emissions Trading Scheme –The 2005 Evidence 
NRM 23.2007  Hongyu Ding, Arjan Ruijs and Ekko C. van Ierland: Designing a Decision Support System for Marine Reserves 
Management: An Economic Analysis for the Dutch North Sea 
CCMP 24.2007  Massimiliano Mazzanti, Anna Montini and Roberto Zoboli: Economic Dynamics, Emission Trends and the EKC 
Hypothesis New Evidence Using NAMEA and Provincial Panel Data for Italy 
ETA 25.2007  Joan Canton: Redealing the Cards: How the Presence of an Eco-Industry Modifies the Political Economy of 
Environmental Policies 
ETA 26.2007  Joan Canton: Environmental Taxation and International Eco-Industries 
CCMP 27.2007  Oscar Cacho and Leslie Lipper (lxxxii): Abatement and Transaction Costs of Carbon-Sink Projects Involving 
Smallholders 
CCMP 28.2007  A. Caparrós, E. Cerdá, P. Ovando and P. Campos  (lxxxii): Carbon Sequestration with Reforestations and 
Biodiversity-Scenic Values 
CCMP 29.2007  Georg E. Kindermann, Michael Obersteiner, Ewald Rametsteiner and Ian McCallcum (lxxxii): Predicting the 
Deforestation–Trend Under Different Carbon–Prices CCMP 30.2007  Raul Ponce-Hernandez (lxxxii): A Modelling Framework for Addressing the Synergies between Global 
Conventions through Land Use Changes: Carbon Sequestration, Biodiversity Conservation, Prevention of Land 
Degradation and Food Security in Agricultural and Forested Lands in Developing Countries 
ETA 31.2007  Michele Moretto and Gianpaolo Rossini: Are Workers’ Enterprises Entry Policies Conventional 
KTHC 32.2007  Giacomo Degli Antoni: Do Social Relations Affect Economic Welfare? A Microeconomic Empirical Analysis 
CCMP 33.2007  Reyer Gerlagh and Onno Kuik: Carbon Leakage with International Technology Spillovers 
CCMP 34.2007  Richard S.J. Tol: The Impact of a Carbon Tax on International Tourism 
CCMP 35.2007  Reyer Gerlagh, Snorre Kverndokk and Knut Einar Rosendahl: Optimal Timing of Environmental Policy; 
Interaction Between Environmental Taxes and Innovation Externalitie 
SIEV 36.2007  Anna Alberini and Alberto Longo: Valuing the Cultural Monuments of Armenia: Bayesian Updating of Prior 
Beliefs in Contingent Valuation 
CCMP 37.2007  Roeland Bracke, Tom Verbeke and Veerle Dejonckheere: What Distinguishes EMAS Participants? An 
Exploration of Company Characteristics 
CCMP 38.2007  E. Tzouvelekas, D. Vouvaki and A. Xepapadeas: Total Factor Productivity Growth and the Environment: A Case 
for Green Growth Accounting 
CCMP 39.2007  Klaus Keller, Louise I. Miltich, Alexander Robinson and Richard S.J. Tol: How Overconfident are Current
Projections of Anthropogenic Carbon Dioxide Emissions? 
CCMP 40.2007  Massimiliano Mazzanti
 
and Roberto Zoboli: Environmental Efficiency, Emission Trends and Labour 
Productivity: Trade-Off or Joint Dynamics? Empirical Evidence Using NAMEA Panel Data 
PRCG 41.2007  Veronica Ronchi: Populism and Neopopulism in Latin America: Clientelism, Trade Union Organisation and 
Electoral Support in Mexico and Argentina in the ‘90s 
PRCG 42.2007  Veronica Ronchi: The Neoliberal Myth in Latin America: The Cases of Mexico and Argentina in the ‘90s 
CCMP 43.2007  David Anthoff, Cameron Hepburn  and Richard S.J. Tol: Equity Weighting and the Marginal Damage Costs of 
Climate Change 
ETA 44.2007  Bouwe R. Dijkstra  and Dirk T.G. Rübbelke: Group Rewards and Individual Sanctions in Environmental Policy 
KTHC 45.2007  Benno Torgler: Trust in International Organizations: An Empirical Investigation Focusing on the United Nations
CCMP 46.2007  Enrica De Cian, Elisa Lanzi  and Roberto Roson: The Impact of Temperature Change on Energy Demand: A 
Dynamic Panel Analysis 
CCMP 47.2007  Edwin van der Werf: Production Functions for Climate Policy Modeling: An Empirical Analysis 
KTHC 48.2007  Francesco Lancia and Giovanni Prarolo: A Politico-Economic Model of Aging, Technology Adoption and 
Growth 
NRM 49.2007  Giulia Minoia: Gender Issue and Water Management in the Mediterranean Basin, Middle East and  North Africa
KTHC 50.2007  Susanna Mancinelli and Massimiliano Mazzanti: SME Performance, Innovation and Networking Evidence on 
Complementarities for a Local Economic System 
CCMP 51.2007  Kelly C. de Bruin, Rob B. Dellink
 and Richard S.J. Tol:  AD-DICE: An Implementation of Adaptation in the DICE
Model 
NRM 52.2007  Frank van Kouwen, Carel Dieperink, Paul P. Schot and Martin J. Wassen: Interactive Problem Structuring with 
ICZM Stakeholders 
CCMP 53.2007  Valeria Costantini  and Francesco Crespi: Environmental Regulation and the Export Dynamics of Energy 
Technologies 
CCMP 54.2007  Barbara Buchner, Michela Catenacci and Alessandra Sgobbi: Governance and Environmental Policy 
Integration in Europe: What Can We learn from the EU Emission Trading Scheme? 
CCMP 55.2007  David Anthoff and Richard S.J. Tol: On International Equity Weights and National Decision Making on Climate 
Change 
CCMP 56.2007  Edwin van der Werf and Sonja Peterson: Modeling Linkages Between Climate Policy and Land Use: An 
Overview 
CCMP 57.2007  Fabien Prieur: The Environmental Kuznets Curve in a World of Irreversibility 
KTHC 58.2007  Roberto Antonietti and Giulio Cainelli: Production Outsourcing, Organizational Governance and Firm’s 
Technological Performance: Evidence from Italy 
SIEV 59.2007  Marco Percolo: Urban Transport Policies and the Environment: Evidence from Italy 
ETA 60.2007  Henk Folmer and Pierre von Mouche: Linking of Repeated Games. When Does It Lead to More Cooperation 
and Pareto Improvements? 
CCMP 61.2007  Arthur Riedacker (lxxxi): A Global Land Use and Biomass Approach to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 
Fossil Fuel Use and to Preserve Biodiversity 
CCMP 62.2007  Jordi Roca and Mònica Serrano: Atmospheric Pollution and Consumption Patterns in Spain: An Input-Output 
Approach 
CCMP 63.2007  Derek W. Bunn and Carlo Fezzi (lxxxi): Interaction of European  Carbon Trading and Energy Prices 
CTN 
 
64.2007  Benjamin Golub and Matthew O. Jackson (lxxxiii): Naïve Learning in Social Networks: Convergence, Influence 
and Wisdom of Crowds 
CTN 65.2007  Jacob K. Goeree, Arno Riedl and Aljaž Ule (lxxxiii): In Search of Stars: Network Formation among 
Heterogeneous Agents 
CTN 66.2007  Gönül Doğan, M.A.L.M. van Assen, Arnout van de Rijt, and Vincent Buskens (lxxxiii): The Stability of 
Exchange Networks 
CTN 67.2007  Ben Zissimos  (lxxxiii): Why are Trade Agreements Regional? 
CTN 68.2007  Jacques Drèze, Michel Le Breton, Alexei Savvateev and Shlomo Weber (lxxxiii): «Almost» Subsidy-free Spatial 
Pricing in a Multi-dimensional Setting 
CTN 69.2007  Ana Babus (lxxxiii): The Formation of Financial Networks CTN 70.2007  Andrea Galeotti and Sanjeev Goyal (lxxxiii): A Theory of Strategic Diffusion 
IEM 71.2007  Francesco Bosello, Enrica De Cian and Roberto Roson: Climate Change, Energy Demand and Market Power in 
a General Equilibrium Model of the World Economy 
ETA 72.2007  Gastón Giordana and Marc Willinger: Fixed Instruments to Cope with Stock Externalities An Experimental 
Evaluation 
KTHC 73.2007  Oguzhan Dincer  and Eric Uslaner: Trust and Growth 
CCMP 74.2007  Fei Teng and Alun Gu: Climate Change: National and Local Policy Opportunities in China 
KTHC 75.2007  Massimiano Bucchi  and Valeria Papponetti: Research Evaluation as a Policy Design Tool: Mapping 
Approaches across a Set of Case Studies 
SIEV 76.2007  Paolo Figini, Massimiliano Castellani and Laura Vici: Estimating Tourist Externalities on Residents: A Choice 
Modeling Approach to the Case of Rimini 
IEM 77.2007  Irene Valsecchi: Experts and Non-experts 
CCMP 78.2007  Giuseppe Di Vita: Legal Families and Environmental Protection: is there  a Causal Relationship? 
KTHC 79.2007  Roberto Antonietti and Giulio Cainelli: Spatial Agglomeration, Technology and Outsourcing of Knowledge
Intensive Business Services Empirical Insights from Italy 
KTHC 80.2007  Iacopo Grassi: The Music Market in the Age of Download  
ETA 81.2007  Carlo Carraro and Alessandra Sgobbi: Modelling Negotiated Decision Making: a Multilateral, Multiple Issues, 
Non-Cooperative Bargaining Model with Uncertainty 
CCMP 82.2007  Valentina Bosetti, Carlo Carraro, Emanuele Massetti and Massimo Tavoni: International Energy R&D 
Spillovers and the Economics of Greenhouse Gas Atmospheric Stabilization 
CCMP 83.2007  Sjak Smulders and Edwin van der Werf. Climate Policy and the Optimal Extraction of High- and Low-Carbon 
Fossil Fuels 
SIEV 84.2007  Benno Torgler, Bruno S. Frey and Clevo Wilson: Environmental and Pro-Social Norms: Evidence from 30 
Countries 
KTHC 85.2007  Elena Bellini, Ugo Gasparino, Barbara Del Corpo and William Malizia: Impact of Cultural Tourism upon 
Urban Economies: An Econometric Exercise 
NRM 86.2007  David Tomberlin and Garth Holloway: Trip-Level Analysis of Efficiency Changes in Oregon’s Deepwater 
Trawl Fishery 
CTN 87.2007  Pablo Revilla: Many-to-One Matching when Colleagues Matter 
IEM 88.2007  Hipòlit Torró: Forecasting Weekly Electricity Prices at Nord Pool 
ETA 89.2007  Y. Hossein Farzin: Sustainability and Optimality in Economic Development:  Theoretical Insights and Policy 
Prospects 
NRM 90.2007  P. Sarfo-Mensah and  W. Oduro: Traditional Natural Resources Management Practices and Biodiversity 
Conservation in Ghana: A Review of Local Concepts and Issues on Change and Sustainability 
NRM 91.2007  Lorenzo Pellegrini: The Rule of The Jungle in Pakistan: A Case Study on Corruption and Forest Management in 
Swat 
NRM 92.2007  Arjan Ruijs: Welfare and Distribution Effects of Water Pricing Policies 
ETA 93.2007  Jean-Marie Grether, Nicole A. Mathys and Jaime de Melo: Trade, Technique and Composition Effects: What is 
Behind the Fall in World-Wide SO2 Emissions 1990-2000? 





















 (lxxxi) This paper was presented at the EAERE-FEEM-VIU Summer School on "Computable General 
Equilibrium Modeling in Environmental and Resource Economics", held in Venice from June 25th to 
July 1st, 2006 and supported by the Marie Curie Series of Conferences "European Summer School in 
Resource and Environmental Economics". 
(lxxxii) This paper was presented at the Workshop on “Climate Mitigation Measures in the Agro-Forestry 
Sector and Biodiversity Futures”, Trieste, 16-17 October 2006 and jointly organised by The Ecological 
and Environmental Economics - EEE Programme, The Abdus Salam International Centre for Theoretical 
Physics - ICTP, UNESCO Man and the Biosphere Programme - MAB, and The International Institute for 
Applied Systems Analysis - IIASA. 
(lxxxiii) This paper was presented at the 12th Coalition Theory Network Workshop organised by the 
Center for Operation Research and Econometrics (CORE) of the Université Catholique de Louvain, held 














  2007 SERIES 
  CCMP  Climate Change Modelling and Policy  (Editor: Marzio Galeotti ) 
  SIEV  Sustainability Indicators and Environmental Valuation (Editor: Anil Markandya) 
  NRM  Natural Resources Management  (Editor: Carlo Giupponi) 
  KTHC  Knowledge, Technology, Human Capital  (Editor: Gianmarco Ottaviano) 
  IEM  International Energy Markets (Editor: Matteo Manera) 
  CSRM  Corporate Social Responsibility and Sustainable Management (Editor: Giulio Sapelli) 
  PRCG  Privatisation Regulation Corporate Governance (Editor: Bernardo Bortolotti) 
  ETA  Economic Theory and Applications (Editor: Carlo Carraro) 
  CTN  Coalition Theory Network 
 